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Millions of people worldwide engage in online role-playing with their
avatar, a virtual agent that represents the self. Previous behavioral
studies have indicated that many gamers identify more strongly with
their avatar than with their biological self. Through their avatar,
gamers develop social networks and learn new social-cognitive skills.
The cognitive neurosciences have yet to identify the neural processes
that underlie self-identification with these virtual agents. We applied
functional neuroimaging to 22 long-term online gamers and 21
nongaming controls, while they rated personality traits of self, avatar,
and familiar others. Strikingly, neuroimaging data revealed greater
avatar-referential cortical activity in the left inferior parietal lobe,
a region associated with self-identification from a third-person
perspective. The magnitude of this brain activity correlated positively
with the propensity to incorporate external body enhancements into
one’s bodily identity. Avatar-referencing furthermore recruited greater
activity in the rostral anterior cingulate gyrus, suggesting relatively
greater emotional self-involvement with one’s avatar. Post-scanning
behavioral data revealed superior recognition memory for avatar
relative to others. Interestingly, memory for avatar positively covaried
with play duration. These findings significantly advance our knowledge
about the brain’s plasticity to self-identify with virtual agents and the
human cognitive-affective potential to live and learn in virtual worlds.
Keywords: fMRI, memory, new media, self-identification, virtual agents
Introduction
Recent sociotechnical developments involving online virtual
worlds have made possible new ways in which human beings
can experience the self (Yee 2006; Ash et al. 2007; Bainbridge
2007; Donath 2007; Gorini et al. 2007). Today, millions of
people across the globe inhabit online virtual worlds, where
they engage in work, play, and adventures via an online artiﬁcial
agent or avatar (Yee 2006; Bainbridge 2007). Through their
avatar, an online animated character that represents the self,
gamers establish friendships, develop new social skills, and
express their individuality (Yee 2006; Miller 2007). Long-term
gamers gradually build an avatar-centered autobiographical
narrative of their online adventures and social relations.
Interestingly, role-playing games with avatars are increasingly
used in training programs for highly specialized personnel, such
as astronauts and people in the military (Rauterberg et al. 2008;
Wilson 2008). Moreover, gamers are progressively encouraged to
add valuable gaming experiences, such as leadership qualities
and people skills, to their professional resume (Miller 2007;
Faylor 2008).
In future human societies, the personal identity of many
individuals may by default include an avatar that parallels our
biological self in complexity and experiential richness. Entire
generations may grow up living, learning, and socializing in
online virtual environments. Today, a glimpse of such a futur-
istic human life is provided by players of massively multiplayer
online role-playing games, such as Second Life and World of
Warcraft (WoW; for a detailed explanation, see Bainbridge,
2007). Role-playing through their avatar, these gamers roam
the virtual worlds for more than 20 h per week (Yee 2006).
Evidence from sociology and cyberpsychology indicates that
long-term players of online role-playing games incorporate the
avatar into their self-concept (Turkle 1994, 1995; Miller 2007).
Some gamers seem to identify even more strongly with their
avatar than with their real self (Bessie`re et al. 2007; Yee et al.
2009). Sense of agency and control over the avatar (Pearce and
Artemesia 2006) as well as the intense emotional involvement
(Ravaja et al. 2006; Bessie`re et al. 2007) of gamers during online
role-playing may facilitate this kind of self-identiﬁcation. Yet
despite growing research on the neural basis of self-represen-
tation (Gillihan and Farah 2005; Legrand and Ruby 2009;
Christoff et al. 2011), neuroscience has yet to address how
humans self-identify with these online artiﬁcial agents.
Using functional neuroimaging of long-term gamers, we
addressed this issue by investigating the cognitive neural processes
mediating avatar-referencing compared with self-referencing and
other-referencing. More speciﬁcally, we focused our investigation
on 3 key features of self-identiﬁcation with avatars in massively
online role-playing games, namely 1) the third-person visual
perspective on the avatar. 2) players’ emotional involvement with
their avatar, and 3) avatar-related memory.
A unique feature of online role-playing games is that players
can control their avatar from an elevated third-person visual
perspective (Laird and van Lent 2001). In the third-person
gaming mode, players continuously have a visual percept of
their avatar while they control its movements in the online
world. This third-person perspective (3PP) on the avatar may
resemble the 3PP on self, where one imagines oneself as seen
from the outside. This 3PP on self can occur during
autobiographical memory retrieval and self-projection to the
future (Buckner and Carroll 2007). The 3PP on the avatar may
also resemble illusory own-body perceptions, such as out-of-
body experiences (OBEs; Blanke et al. 2002, 2005; Ehrsson
2007; Lenggenhager et al. 2007). It is also the perspective
through which we can imagine how we appear to others,
a cognitive ability known as perspective switching and
considered to be a basic property of social cognition (Decety
and Lamm 2006, 2007).
Whereas the 3PP on the self must be mentally simulated in
memory, prospection, and social cognition, the 3PP on the
avatar is a visual percept for gamers who play in the third-person
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mode. In this respect, self-identiﬁcation with the perceived
avatar may resemble self-identiﬁcation with the externally
perceived own body in OBEs. Thus, gaming may offer a distinct
nonpathological form of self-experience in which long-term
gamers self-identify with their avatar from a 3PP.
Findings from studies using transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion and direct electrical cortical stimulation provide evidence
for a causal relation between disruption of activity in the right
inferior parietal lobe, or angular gyrus, and a 3PP on the self
(Blanke et al. 2002, 2005). When a 3PP on the self coincides
with a disturbed sense of spatial unity between self and body,
then an OBE may occur (Blanke et al. 2002, 2005; Ehrsson 2007;
Lenggenhager et al. 2007). Some researchers propose that the
spontaneous occurrence of OBEs relies on the same functional
mechanisms that we use during voluntary mental 3PP-imagery
of our own body (Brugger 2002; Blanke et al. 2005).
This implied relation between disruption of the right angular
gyrus and 3PP self-identiﬁcation, however, may not be so clear-
cut. Recent theories rather assign a special role to the left
hemisphere in self-recognition and self-identiﬁcation (for
a review, see Gazzaniga 2008) as well as sense of agency (for
a review, see Decety and Grezes 2006; see also Decety et al.
1997; Ruby and Decety 2001). In describing recent ﬁndings on
face recognition in split-brain patients, Gazzaniga (2008)
hypotheses the role of the right hemisphere in rejecting that
a person is self (‘‘Nope, it’s not me!’’) while attributing a key
role to the left hemisphere in retrieval of conﬁrmative self-
knowledge and self-recognition (‘‘Yep, it’s me!’’). Does this
lateralization also hold for the inferior parietal cortex?
Despite an abundance of literature associating increased
activity in the right angular gyrus with detection that the agent
of an action perceived from a 3PP is not self but other (Ruby
and Decety 2001; Farrer and Frith 2002; Farrer et al. 2004,
2008), evidence for the role of the right hemisphere in
conﬁrmative self-identiﬁcation (‘‘Yep it’s me!’’) remains in-
conclusive (Gazzaniga 2008).
Meanwhile, empirical evidence is gradually emerging that
particularly the left rather than the right angular gyrus may be
involved in conﬁrmative self-identiﬁcation and sense of agency
(for a review, see Decety and Grezes 2006). For example, Ruby
and Decety (2001) demonstrated that when participants
imagined themselves being the agent of an action relative to
imagining someone else being the agent, activity in the left
angular gyrus increased. The reversed contrast resulted in
greater activity in the right angular gyrus.
Another study showed that impairment of the left parietal
cortex compromised the correct attribution of agency to self
or others (Sirigu et al. 1999). Left parietal patients were more
inclined than healthy controls to claim agency of 3PP-observed
correct hand movements that were executed by others, even if
the patients themselves actually executed the required hand
movements incorrectly. In the light of Gazzaniga’s hypothesis,
this impaired self-other distinction with left parietal lesion
patients might be due to aberrant processes of conﬁrmatory
self-identiﬁcation (‘‘Yep it’s me!’’).
Furthermore and as described above, the various studies by
Blanke et al. show that reduced activity in the right angular
gyrus does not result in conﬁrmatory self-identiﬁcation, for
example, by increased sense of agency (‘‘Yep it’s me!’’) but
actually leads to OBEs (Blanke et al. 2002, 2005; Ehrsson 2007;
Lenggenhager et al. 2007). OBEs are typically associated with
a sense of spatial alienation from one’s own physical body, or
disembodiment, whereby the sense of self and sense of agency
transfer away from the physical own body and become located
in a second, illusory body located at an elevated visuospatial
level (Fig. 1A).
In contrast, 3PP-gamers assume full control over their avatar
body (Pearce and Artemesia 2006) and may appropriate this
avatar body into their own self-concept (Fig. 1B). So despite the
superﬁcial similarities between the 2 conditions, in our view,
OBEs and the gamer--avatar dyad are 2 distinct phenomena (Fig.
1). In the case of OBEs, there is a confused sense of self and
agency that is associated with the illusion of being outside of
and alienated from one’s own body. In the case of 3PP-gaming,
there is an appropriation of the avatar body into the self-
concept that logically follows from being in control over the
3PP avatar body.
Based on the phenomenal difference between OBEs and
3PP-gaming, the role of the inferior parietal cortex in agency
and the 3PP representation of movement (Grezes and Costes
1998; Farrer and Frith 2002) as well as the hypothesized role of
the left hemisphere in conﬁrmative self-identiﬁcation (Gazzaniga
2008), we hypothesized that left inferior parietal regions play
a key role in avatar-referencing and thus more generally in self-
identiﬁcation with the avatar via a 3PP.
It is well known that individuals differ in levels of body
plasticity, that is, how easily they incorporate and self-identify
with body enhancements (e.g., prosthetics) and external items
(e.g., body adornments and accessories; MacLachlan et al.
2003). Hence, not all long-term gamers might identify with
their avatar to the same degree. In line with this idea, we
predicted that degree of avatar-related activation in the inferior
parietal lobe, reﬂecting self-identiﬁcation from a 3PP, would
correlate positively with individual dispositions to self-identify
with external bodies and objects.
A second feature of self-identiﬁcation with one’s avatar, as
suggested by research from cyberpsychology (Ravaja et al.
Figure 1. Conceptualization of the phenomenal difference between OBEs and the
gamer--avatar experience in 3PP-gaming. (A) During OBEs, the self is alienated from
the physical body. Sense of self and agency are located in a second, illusory body.
From this elevated visuospatial perspective in the illusory body, the physical body is
observed. OBEs often occur in supine position (Blanke et al. 2005; Blanke and
Metzinger 2009). (B) In 3PP-gaming, the gamer, typically seated behind a computer
screen, sees the avatar from an elevated visuospatial perspective, usually from the
back. In contrast to OBEs, gamers assume full control over their avatar body. This
gaming experience may facilitate appropriation of the avatar body into the gamers’
self-concept. Due to presence during gaming, self-location may transfer to the avatar
body, alternate back and forth between the gamer’s body and the avatar body, or
may be present in both gamer and avatar (bilocation). Bold arrows indicate egocentric
viewing direction. SL 5 self-location. Modified after Blanke and Metzinger (2009).
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2006; Bessie`re et al. 2007), is gamers’ intense emotional
involvement with their avatar. Earlier neuroimaging studies
have shown that the rostral part of the anterior cingulate gyrus
(rACG), which borders the medial prefrontal cortex, plays an
important role in the evaluative representation of both
emotions (Bush et al. 2000; Gusnard et al. 2001) and bodily
sensations (Leknes and Tracey 2008). Based on experimental
evidence that rACG activity differentiates self from others
(Damasio 1999; Bush et al. 2000; Gusnard et al. 2001; David
et al. 2006; Heatherton et al. 2006; Schilbach et al. 2006; Leknes
and Tracey 2008), we hypothesized that emotional self-
involvement with the avatar should be reﬂected by greater
avatar-related rACG activity relative to familiar others.
A third feature of self-identiﬁcation with one’s avatar, as
indicated by research from cyberpsychology (Turkle 1994,
1995; Pearce and Artemesia 2006; Miller 2007), is the ‘‘virtual
autobiography,’’ or avatar-centered narrative, that long-term
gamers build by role-playing through their avatar. How does
this avatar-centered narrative relate to one’s autobiographical
narrative, the narrative one builds in interaction with close
others or the narrative one develops by observing familiar
distant others? Interestingly, a substantial body of memory
research demonstrates that memory for self-related informa-
tion, also called self-referent information, is superior to
memory about others, or other-referent information (for
meta-analyses, see Symons and Johnson 1997; Mashek et al.
2003). However, this memory advantage for self-referent
information relative to other-referent information decreases if
the other person is a close other. Other-referent memory is
thus enhanced by interpersonal closeness (Symons and
Johnson 1997; Mashek et al. 2003).
It remains a topic of investigation, however, to what extent
self-identiﬁcation by role-playing through an avatar modulates
avatar-referent memory. In the case of avatars, one cannot
really speak of interaction or interpersonal closeness with one’s
avatar, as the avatar is a form of self-representation. Gamers act
through the avatar and do not interact with the avatar. Self-
identiﬁcation with the avatar may foster avatar-referent
memory strategies that mimic the advantageous self-referent
memory strategies.
Considering results from previous studies indicating that
many gamers strongly self-identify with their avatar (Turkle
1994, 1995; Yee 2006; Bessie`re et al. 2007; Yee et al. 2009), we
hypothesized that avatar-referent memory would be superior
to memory for familiar others. Moreover, we predicted that
duration of the role-playing experience with the avatar would
enrich the avatar-centered narrative and hence facilitate avatar-
referent memory, as a feature of self-identiﬁcation with one’s
avatar.
To test these hypotheses, we scanned 22 healthy long-term
players of WoW (Blizzard Entertainment Inc., Irvine, CA)
(Bainbridge 2007; Yee et al. 2009). We selected long-term
gamers who played only in third-person mode. Participants
rated the applicability of personality trait words (e.g., nasty,
courageous) to their avatar, self, close other, and familiar
distant other in a so-called implicit encoding--recognition
memory paradigm (Rogers et al. 1977; Symons and Johnson
1997; Mashek et al. 2003; Heatherton et al. 2006; Vanderwal
et al. 2008). The idea behind the implicit encoding--recognition
paradigm is that while participants rate the applicability of
traits (e.g., nasty, courageous) to the different person con-
ditions (e.g., self, avatar), they implicitly associate the trait word
under consideration with the person condition. We can test
the strength of this implicit encoding of trait-person associa-
tions by presenting participants with a surprise recognition
task after the encoding task (see Materials and Methods).
According to previous research (Symons and Johnson 1997;
Mashek et al. 2003), the closer the other person is to self, the
better the recognition memory for items that were presented
with the name of this other person in the preceding encoding
task.
To rule out the possibility that gamers exhibit abnormalities
in person processing, we compared them with a matched
nongaming control group (n = 21). Furthermore, to rule out
the alternative explanation that avatar-referential activity
reﬂects a mere familiarity effect (i.e., that gamers merely
consider their avatar as a familiar animated character), we
included a reference condition to a highly familiar animated
character, that is, the participants’ favorite cartoon character.
We further puriﬁed all referencing conditions by subtracting
neural activation from a low-level control condition, that is,
counting syllables (Fig. 2; see Materials and Methods).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed native-Dutch speaking players of WoW
(mean age 22.77 years, SD 2.71; 12 males; mean WoW play duration
2.67 years, SD 1.47; mean play frequency 17.82 h per week, SD 8.64)
with graduate or undergraduate education levels, normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity, and without self-reported neurological or
psychiatric disorders participated in the experiment. For an explana-
tion of WoW, see Yee et al. (2009). All gamers played only from a third-
person (elevated) visual perspective on their avatar.
Additionally, 21 matched nongaming controls (mean age 21.71 years,
SD 2.88; 10 males) participated in the study. We asked participants in
the control group to indicate their favorite cartoon character, which
would serve as their familiar animated character condition (see
Supplementary Material). The mean duration the controls considered
the cartoon character their favorite was 7.70 years, with a SD of 4.22.
The groups were matched on sex, age, education, and body plasticity.
We used the TABP (MacLachlan et al. 2003) to measure the level of
body plasticity (see Supplementary Material). Moreover, considering
the popular idea that people who are heavily involved in game-playing
Figure 2. Schematic example of a trait trial as presented to gamers of the online
role-playing game WoW (for an explanation of the game, see Bessie`re et al. 2007;
Yee et al. 2009) in the fMRI experiment. Within a response window of 3 s,
participants rated the extent to which positive and negative trait words described
their avatar, self, close other, and familiar distant other (1 5 not at all, 5 5 very
well). Control conditions included a counting syllables task and a matched nongaming
control group, which rated the applicability of trait adjectives to favorite cartoon
character instead of avatar (not illustrated; see Materials and Methods).
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may have characteristics, such as intense preoccupation, that are
related to Asperger’s syndrome (Bland 2008; Charlton and Danforth
2009), we also matched both groups on autistic traits. To assess
subjects’ position on or near the autism spectrum, we used the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al. 2001, see also SM). All
subjects gave written informed consent for this study according to the
institutional guidelines set forth by the local ethics committee
(Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek, region Arnhem-Nijmegen),
prior to the experiment. Subjects either received 25 euros or study
credits for their participation. Two players and one control participant
were excluded from the fMRI data analysis due to technical issues or
excessive head motions.
Procedure
Questionnaires
Prior to scanning, all 43 participants completed questionnaires
assessing demographics, handedness, psychological and phys-
ical health, body plasticity, autism, and the names of their best
friend and familiar animated character. For players, the familiar
animated character corresponded to their main avatar in WoW,
and for controls, the familiar animated character was their
favorite cartoon character. Participants also indicated, in years
and months, play duration with their avatar (players), how long
they had considered the cartoon as their favorite (controls) and
how long they had considered their designated close other as
their best friend.
Encoding Task: Referential Processing
Referential processing paradigms are widely used in social
psychology to assess differences between cognitive processing
of self-related and other-related information. (Rogers et al.
1977). These paradigms have recently been adapted to neuro-
imaging experiments (Damasio et al. 2000; Gusnard et al. 2001;
Macrae et al. 2004; Ochsner et al. 2004; Phan et al. 2004;
Heatherton et al. 2006) to investigate cognitive neural differ-
ences between processing of self and others. In our study, we
employed a mixed blocked event-related fMRI design for the
referential processing task. The referential processing task also
served as the implicit encoding task for the subsequent post-
scanning recognition memory task (see below). Participant
rated the extent to which traits described avatar, self, close
other, and familiar distant other, using a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = not at all, 5 = very well [Fig. 2]). We controlled for
perceptual and motor effects by including the control
condition of counting syllables (range: 1--5 [Supplementary
Material]). Furthermore, matched nongaming controls did not
have an avatar condition but rated the applicability of traits
describing a familiar animated character whose actions they
did not control, that is, their favorite cartoon character
(Supplementary Material).
While lying in the scanner, participants completed a ﬁxed set
of practice trials to become familiar with the custom-made 5-
button mouse and the task. The ensuing single fMRI scanning
session lasted approximately 44 min (M = 43.80 min, SD = 0.22
min), during which we presented 10 ‘‘super blocks,’’ each
consisting of 5 trait judgment blocks (e.g., self, avatar, close
other, distant other, and syllables) and 5 ‘‘baseline’’ blocks. Each
trait judgment block consisted of 5 trait trials related to one
person condition only. Trait judgment blocks were alternated
by a baseline block, comprising 5 baseline trials, which each
consisted of a low contrast gray ﬁxation cross. We included
these baseline blocks to allow participants to return to
a psychological baseline state where they did not actively
think about the person in the previous condition. The order of
the blocks was randomized according to two 5 3 5 balanced
Latin squares, to ensure that each judgment condition followed
immediately after every other judgment condition an equal
number of times (Edwards 1962).
Each trait judgment block began with a prompt screen,
indicating the name of the person to judge (self, avatar, close
other, and familiar distant other). The prompt screen preceding
syllable blocks indicated that the next block involved counting
syllables. In case of baseline blocks, low-contrast text on the
prompt screen informed participants that the ensuing block
would be a relax block in which they only needed to keep their
eyes focused on the ﬁxation cross. Stimulus presentation lasted
3 s, during which a trait adjective appeared on the center of the
screen, the cue appeared above the trait and the 5-point Likert
scale occurred below the trait (Fig. 2). Trait trials, baseline
trials, and prompt screens were pulse locked and had a ﬁxed
duration of 4400 ms or 2 time repetition [TR]. The in-
terstimulus interval (time interval between stimulus offset
and subsequent stimulus onset) within a block varied between
400 and 2400 ms, with an average of 1400 ms. Text screens
were presented in off-white Arial font and centered on a black
background.
Post-Scanning Surprise Recognition Task
After the scanning session, participants completed a ﬁller task
for 5 min while seated behind a standard computer in a test
cubicle, followed by a self-paced surprise recognition task,
which lasted approximately 12 min (M = 11.57 min, SD = 3.15).
Participants viewed the 250 trait adjectives previously pre-
sented during the referential processing task randomized along
with 250 novel trait adjectives that had not been presented
during scanning. Words appeared individually in the center of
the computer screen and were followed by the next word
immediately after the participant had responded. Using left-
and right-handed key presses, participants indicated for each
word whether they had seen the word in the scanner or not.
The order of response buttons for Yes and No was counter-
balanced across subjects, so that half of the players and controls
had to respond with Yes by pressing the right key. We
calculated performance in the recognition memory test, that is,
d-prime, as the difference between z-transforms of hit rate and
false alarm rate (Macmillan and Creelman 2005/1991).
Apparatus
All neuroimaging took place at the Donders Centre for
Cognitive Neuroimaging (DCCN, Donders Institute for Brain,
Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands) using a Siemens Trio 3T whole-
body MR scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a standard
birdcage head coil. An LCD projector presented the stimuli
onto a rear projection screen mounted at the head end of the
scanner bore. Participants viewed the stimuli through a custom
made mirror positioned on the head coil. All stimuli were
delivered using Presentation software version 12.2 (Neuro-
behavioral Systems, Davis, CA) run on a Dell Workstation
(Austin, TX).
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fMRI Data Acquisition
We collected all functional images in a single scanning session
using an echo-planar imaging sequence sensitive to blood
oxygen level--dependent contrast (T 2 ) (TR = 2200 ms, time
echo [TE] = 35 ms, ﬂip angle = 90, voxel size = 3.5 3 3.5 3 3.0
mm). The 1210 volumes (34 transversal slices, slice gap = 0.5
mm, ﬁeld of view = 224 mm, slice matrix size = 64 3 64) were
acquired in ascending order and allowed for complete brain
coverage, except parts of the cerebellum. Following functional
imaging, we acquired anatomical images using a T1-weighted
3D magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (192
sagittal slices, TR = 2300 ms, TE = 3.03 ms, ﬂip angle = 8, voxel
size = 1 3 1 3 1 mm).
fMRI Data Analysis
We preprocessed and analyzed functional imaging data in
SPM5 (Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK; http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), using a general linear
model. Preprocessing steps involved spike removal, spatial
realignment, slice timing correction, extended coregistra-
tion, normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) template with a resolution of 2 3 2 3 2 mm, and spatial
smoothing by an isotropic 8-mm full-width at half-maximum
Gaussian kernel. For each participant, we computed linear
contrasts of parameter estimates (b) for each comparison at
each voxel. These contrast images were subsequently
entered into random-effects analyses. In these random-effects
analysis, resulting SPMs of the t-statistic were corrected for
multiple comparisons at the cluster level, using a voxel-wise
threshold of P < 0.001. Moreover, in line with previous
research demonstrating brain areas preferentially related to
self-referential processing (Damasio et al. 2000; Gusnard et al.
2001; Macrae et al. 2004; Ochsner et al. 2004; Phan et al.
2004; Heatherton et al. 2006), we deﬁned a region of interest
(ROI) in the rostral anterior cingulate gyrus (rACG),
bordering with the medial prefrontal cortex. We ﬁrst
localized the self-referencing region by testing the contrast
Self > (Avatar, Close Other, and Familiar Distant Other) in the
players group (n = 20), which yielded a cluster in the right
rACG with a peak voxel at MNI coordinates 2, 38, 12. We then
used MarsBaR v0.42 software (http://marsbar.source
forge.net) to import an image of the signiﬁcant SPM cluster
to create the ROI and to perform subsequent independent
ROI analyses. The independent post hoc comparisons
consisted of Avatar > Close Other and Avatar > Familiar
Distant Others as well as the independent control compar-
ison (Avatar > Syllable)PLAYERS > (Cartoon > Syllable)CONTROLS.
The post hoc comparisons explicitly did not include the
Self condition, which was used to create the ROI, so our
analyses are not susceptible to the so-called ‘‘double-dipping’’
(Kriegeskorte et al. 2009).
We conducted the fMRI analyses in 4 steps. In the ﬁrst step,
we sought to replicate ﬁndings from previous literature
(Damasio et al. 2000; Gusnard et al. 2001; Macrae et al. 2004;
Ochsner et al. 2004; Phan et al. 2004; Heatherton et al. 2006)
indicating the involvement of the medial prefrontal, inferior
parietal, and temporal cortices in general person processing, by
testing the contrast All Biological Persons > Syllable in a whole-
brain analysis, across all subjects. The label ‘‘All Biological
Persons’’ corresponds to the conditions Self, Close Other, and
Familiar Distant Other.
In the second step, we empirically tested 2 a priori
assumptions, namely 1) that players do not differ from controls
in the way they engage in person processing, by conducting
a two-sample t-test of the contrast All Biological Persons >
Syllable and 2) that processing of familiar animated characters
is similar to processing of biological persons. To this end, we
performed a conjunction analysis of (Avatar > Syllable) K (All
Biological Persons > Syllable) in the players group to assess
which brain regions become commonly activated for both
avatar AND biological persons, relative to counting syllables.
Similarly, in the control group, we performed a conjunction
analysis of (Cartoon > Syllable) K (All Biological Persons >
Syllable). We performed both conjunction tests on a whole-
brain analysis by testing against the conjunction null hypothesis
that there is no effect of condition A (e.g., Avatar > Syllable) OR
B (e.g., All Biological Persons > Syllable) (Nichols et al. 2005).
The third step in the fMRI analysis centered around the
whole-brain analyses of the key comparisons Avatar > Self and
Avatar > Biological Others (close other, familiar distant other).
In addition to these comparisons, we compared avatar-
referencing in players with cartoon-referencing in controls to
conﬁrm that the predicted greater inferior lobe activation for
avatar was indeed related to avatar-referencing and could not
be explained by a mere familiarity effect of familiar animated
characters in general. Control comparisons were: Cartoon >
Self and Cartoon > Biological Others in the control group. In
these 2 contrasts, we expected to ﬁnd no signiﬁcance. As a ﬁnal
conﬁrmation, we conducted the two-sample t-test of (Avatar >
Self)PLAYERS > (Cartoon > Self)CONTROLS.
The fourth and ﬁnal step in the fMRI analysis concerned the
hypothesis that avatar-referencing involves greater emotional
self-involvement than other-referencing, such as close and
familiar distant others. To test this hypothesis, we performed
the 3 independent post hoc ROI analyses described above,
using the rACG as ROI. We tested the comparisons Avatar >
Close Other and Avatar > Familiar Distant Other in the players
group. Additionally, we conducted the control two-sample
t-test (Avatar > Syllable)PLAYERS > (Cartoon > Syllable)CONTROLS.
In these 3 contrasts, we expected to ﬁnd greater avatar-
referential rACG activity, as an indication of greater emotional
self-involvement of players with their avatar.
Results
To investigate our main hypothesis that avatar-referencing
compared with self- and other-referencing would rely mostly
on a 3PP and thus generate more activity in the angular gyrus,
we compared avatar-referencing to self-referencing and other-
referencing in 2 whole-brain analyses. Strikingly, results
revealed greater activity for avatar in the left angular gyrus of
the inferior parietal lobe (Fig. 3A), relative to self (Brodmann
area [BA 39]), t95 = 4.83, P = 0.001 corrected, and relative to
close other and distant other, t95 = 4.66, P = 0.015 corrected.
Additional control comparisons ruled out a mere familiarity
effect (see supporting online text in Supplementary Material
and Supplementary Table S3).
Notably, and as predicted, the magnitude of this avatar-
referential activity in the left angular gyrus correlated positively
with gamers’ level of body plasticity, r = 0.46, P = 0.042 two-
tailed, n = 20 (Fig. 3B), as measured with the Trinity
Assessment of Body Plasticity (TABP; MacLachlan et al. 2003).
This well established clinical questionnaire indicates the ease
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with which individuals incorporate and self-identify with body
enhancements and adornments.
To investigate the hypothesized role of the rACG in players’
emotional self-involvement with their avatars, we compared
avatar-referencing with close other-referencing and familiar
distant other-referencing within a region of the rACG (BA 32;
see Materials and Methods). Neural activity in this region was
stronger for avatar than for familiar distant other, t95 = 1.90,
P = 0.030 corrected (Fig. 3C). Additional control comparisons
ruled out a mere familiarity effect (see supporting online text
in Supplementary Material and Supplementary Table S3).
Notably, avatar-referencing rACG activity did not differ from
close other-referencing activity in this region, t95 = –0.05,
P = 0.519 corrected.
By rating the applicability of presented trait words to the
presented person condition (e.g., self, avatar) in the functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) task, participants implicitly
associated trait words with each person condition. In the post-
scanning task, we investigated this association by a surprise
recognition task (one player did not complete the post-
scanning recognition memory task. Analysis of recognition
memory data included the remaining 21 players). We com-
pared avatar-referent recognition memory, that is, memory for
trait words previously presented in the avatar condition (M =
1.06, standard deviation [SD] = 0.42), to self-referent memory
(M = 1.30, SD = 0.42), close other-referent memory (M = 1.05,
SD = 0.42), and familiar distant other-referent memory (M = .76,
SD = 0.39). Results revealed that avatar-referent memory was
worse than self-referent memory, t20 = –3.40, P = 0.003.
Interestingly, and as predicted, avatar-referent memory was
superior to familiar distant other-referent memory, t20 = 3.10, P
= 0.006 (Fig. 4A).
Notably, avatar-referent memory did not differ signiﬁcantly
from close other-referent memory, t20 = 0.12, P = 0.91. This
ﬁnding is particularly interesting, considering the fact that play
duration with the avatar (M = 2.67 years, SD = 1.47) was
approximately half of the duration that gamers had known
their close other as their best friend (M = 5.00 years, SD = 2.93),
t20 = –3.91, P = 0.001. Equally notably, and as predicted, avatar-
referent memory correlated positively with play duration, r =
0.49, P = 0.03, n = 21 (Fig. 4B).
Discussion
By coordinated use of functional neuroimaging, a behavioral
encoding-memory paradigm and self-reports, we addressed the
neurocognitive basis of human self-identiﬁcation with avatars
from a third-person perspective. Results conﬁrm our hypoth-
eses regarding brain activity and behavior pertaining to 3
features of self-identiﬁcation with avatars: 1) the third-person
perspective, 2) emotional self-involvement, and 3) avatar-
related memory.
Relating to the third-person perspective (3PP), our results
conﬁrm the predicted functional role of the left angular gyrus
in self-identiﬁcation with external (virtual) bodies that are
perceived and controlled from a 3PP. Present ﬁndings indicate
that avatar-processing in gamers recruited more left angular
gyrus activity than processing of self and others (Fig. 3A).
Control comparisons for this region ruled out a mere familiarity
effect, that is, the alternative explanation that gamers perceive
their avatar as a familiar animated character (Supplementary
Table S3). Interestingly, positive correlations of the magnitude
of avatar-referential activity in the left angular gyrus with
individual body plasticity levels underscore the pivotal role of
this brain region in plasticity to incorporate external body
enhancements and external items (e.g., prosthetics and
accessories; MacLachlan et al. 2003) into one’s bodily identity
(Fig. 3B).
Figure 3. Self-identification with avatars from a third-person perspective. (A) Avatar-referencing versus self- and other-referencing yielded greater activity in the left angular
gyrus (BA 39), P \ 0.001 corrected. (B) Magnitude of avatar-referential activity in the left angular gyrus (52, 70, 30) correlated positively with participants’ score on body
plasticity (24), r 5 0.46, P \ 0.042, n 5 20. (C) Avatar-referencing versus familiar distant other-referencing yielded stronger activity within a region of the rACG (2, 38, 12 [BA
32]), P 5 0.030 corrected. For illustration purposes, graphs are thresholded at P \ 0.001 uncorrected. Activity is plotted on the average normalized high-resolution anatomical
image of participants (n 5 41) and displayed in neurological convention (left hemisphere is depicted on the left). Bar graphs display mean blood oxygen level--dependent signal
change relative to the syllable condition and standard errors. See Supplementary Table S3 for overview of all comparisons.
How the Human Brain Goes Virtual d Ganesh et al.1582
 by guest on M
arch 9, 2015
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Since only avatar-referential and not other-referential angular
gyrus activity signiﬁcantly covaried with body plasticity, one
possibility in line with previous studies (Decety and Grezes
2006; Gazzaniga 2008) is that this form of self-identiﬁcation,
supported by the left angular gyrus, is related to the experience
of agency and control over the observed body. The current
ﬁndings corroborate the possible involvement of the left
angular gyrus in processes of self-identiﬁcation and distinguish-
ing self from others (Decety and Chaminade 2003; Decety and
Grezes 2006; Lamm et al. 2007; Gazzaniga 2008), and warrant
future research to investigate the exact mechanisms un-
derlying these processes.
One important question concerns how involvement of the
left angular gyrus in self-identiﬁcation with avatars from a 3PP
relates to the phenomena of illusory own-body perceptions,
such as OBEs (Blanke and Metzinger 2009). Whereas OBEs have
been found in association with transient lesions in the right
inferior parietal lobe (Blanke et al. 2002, 2005), our results
show that avatar-referencing recruits the left inferior parietal
lobe. These ﬁndings correspond to theories assigning a special-
ized role of the left hemisphere in retrieval of self-knowledge as
well as 3PP own-body recognition (Decety and Grezes 2006;
Gazzaniga 2008). Also, as mentioned in the Introduction,
whereas OBEs are characterized by a disturbed sense of spatial
unity between one’s observed own body and oneself as
observer (Blanke et al. 2002, 2005; Blanke and Thut 2007;
Ehrsson 2007; Lenggenhager et al. 2007), self-identiﬁcation
with the avatar from a 3PP typically involves an appropriation
of the observed and controlled avatar body to the gaming self
(see Fig. 1; Pearce and Artemesia 2006; Ravaja et al. 2006;
Bessie`re et al. 2007; Yee et al. 2009).
On a phenomenal level, the gamer--avatar dyad may be
a mixture between OBEs and a related, yet less well-known
illusory body perception called heautoscopy (Blanke et al.
2004; Blanke and Metzinger 2009). In heautoscopy, a condition
that is associated with impairments in the left inferior parietal
regions, self-location can be either in the physical body or in
the illusory second body or in both. This may also be the case in
3PP-gaming, which additionally shares with OBEs the elevated
visuospatial perspective from where the physical body is
perceived. Future investigations of 3PP-gaming, particularly
the switching of self-location between the gamer’s physical
body and the avatar body as well as bilocation, may inform us
further about the intricate interplay between the inferior
parietal regions in both hemispheres in conﬁrmatory self-
identiﬁcation, agency, and the dynamics of embodiment.
Relating to gamers’ emotional involvement with their avatar,
our results support other studies that ﬁnd a role for the rACG in
evaluating one’s embodied emotional self-involvement with
stimuli under consideration, such as affective pictures, pleasur-
able rewards (e.g., chocolate), or persons (Damasio 1999; Bush
et al. 2000; Gusnard et al. 2001; David et al. 2006; Schilbach
et al. 2006; Leknes and Tracey 2008). The greater activity in
this region for avatar relative to familiar distant other, but not
relative to close other (Fig. 3C and Supplementary Table S3),
suggests that players are as emotionally involved with their
avatar as with a close other. We propose that the experience of
acting through an avatar that represents the self (Pearce and
Artemesia 2006; Ravaja et al. 2006) creates a level of emotional
self-involvement that resembles the level of intimacy one
experiences when interacting with a close other (Decety and
Grezes 2006; Schilbach et al. 2006; Vanderwal et al. 2008).
With respect to avatar-related memory, the post-scanning
recognition memory ﬁndings support the notion that long-term
gaming enhances gamers’ avatar-related memory, a feature of
self-identiﬁcation with one’s avatar. Avatar-related memory
signiﬁcantly surpasses memory for familiar distant others (Fig.
4A). This raises the tantalizing possibility that acting through an
artiﬁcial agent in a virtual world yields more advantageous
memory strategies than familiarity with a real human distant
other.
Recognition memory ﬁndings also indicate that the longer
gamers play through their avatar, the better their avatar-related
memory performance (Fig. 4B). Interestingly, memory for
avatar did not differ from memory for close other, even though
they had known their close other almost twice as long as their
avatar. These ﬁndings indicate that playing experience with an
avatar may yield memory advantages that outweigh the
memory strategies associated with real-life interactions with
human close others.
Together, the present study illuminates how online virtual
worlds may have provided humans with a new mode of self-
identiﬁcation, namely self-identiﬁcation with avatars that
represent the self from a third-person perspective. This new
form of self-identiﬁcation enables humans to build online
autobiographical narratives by ‘‘acting through somebody,’’ that
is, the avatar as seen from a third-person perspective. Acting
through the avatar body may facilitate the appropriation of the
observed and controlled avatar body to gamers’ self-identity.
Acting through somebody entails an addition to our current
social repertoire of ‘‘interacting with somebody,’’ that is, a close
other, and merely ‘‘observing somebody,’’ usually from a third-
person perspective, that is, a familiar distant other. Considering
the growing numbers of people that engage in online role-
playing, acting through somebody may become an important
element of mainstream embodied human social behavior.
Figure 4. Post-scanning surprise recognition memory performance in players. (A) Recognition memory for avatar was superior relative to recognition memory for familiar distant
other, t20 5 3.10, P 5 0.006. Error bars represent standard errors. (B) Avatar memory performance correlated positively with play duration, r 5 0.487, P 5 0.025, n 5 21.
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Learning, socializing, and developing of new cognitive and
affective skills in future human societies may increasingly take
place through role-playing with avatars (Gorini et al. 2007;
Miller 2007; Rauterberg et al. 2008; Wilson 2008).
In conclusion, our study considerably extends scientiﬁc
studies of the human experience of self and others by providing
a neural window onto the new phenomenon of self-identiﬁcation
with virtual agents from a third-person perspective—a phenom-
enon that may profoundly change human social experience
(Turkle 1995; Bainbridge 2007). The current study also under-
scores the value of using online virtual reality technologies in
addition to immersive virtual reality laboratories to investigate
the neural and functional processes underlying different forms of
self-identiﬁcation (Ehrsson 2007; Lenggenhager et al. 2007). The
way is now open for future research to make use of these new
technologies to advance the neuroscience of the self in the fast
changing and increasingly virtual societies of today and
tomorrow.
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